DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY: THE IMPACT
OF INSURANCE
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I
The law grows daily more hospitable to insurability in lieu of fault as the premise
of liability for personal injury.1 The basic fact is the pervasive and systematic use of
machinery. The consequence is high productivity and vast markets. These in turn
have given rise to a concept of measurable risk and an ability to set aside part of the
product to insure the risk. Judges no longer fear to accept this view, if not always
overtly, as the major premise of the administration of the traditional concepts. But
this creates certain contradictions which are only dimly felt or deliberately ignored.
These seem to me to be particularly acute in the field of damages
In some situations the law has explicitly discarded the requirement of fault. A
goodly number of courts, for example, having used MacPherson v. Buick Motor CoY
as a bridge, hold a manufacturer liable to ultimate consumers for "breach of warranty" without a showing of fault. But even where the law still insists on the syntax
of fault and speaks this language it may characterize as negligent, conduct which
by the earlier legal standard or by present colloquial standards is quite innocent.
In a recent FELA case 4 an employee was alleged to have tripped on a clinker or piece
of coal present on a railroad way. The presence of the clinker was held to be
sufficient allegation of the railroad's negligence. I hazard the opinion that there
are very few persons who believe that the failure to remove a stray clinker is a
failure to observe the dictates of decent neighborly regard. The clinker is a point
d'appui, a concrete entity around which it is possible to spin the speech of negligence. It would be a mistake, to be sure, to suppose that the older conceptions are
* A.B., Johns Hopkins University; LL.B., S.J.D., Harvard University. Member of the California
and New York bars. Professor of Law, University of Buffalo, 1936-1948, Dean, 1948-195o; Professor
of Law, Harvard University, since i95o.
'The literature is large. Most of it is collected in EHRENZWE G, NEGLIGENCE WriHouT FAULT 9
et seq. (1951). See particularly James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549 (1948); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.

REv. 359 (195i).
' Among those who stress and applaud the trend toward insurability there is practically no discussion
of the damage problem. Ehrenzweig, however, who writes as much from the point of view of
insurance as of tort liability, does suggest it. Op. cit. supra note I,at 64. On the other hand see
MeNiece and Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JoHNsL. REv. 255, 274 (1952),
discussed below at the conclusion of this article.
217 N. Y. 382, 1ii N. E. io5o (1916).
'Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U. S. 294 (949).
The case of course involves strictly
only a pleading question. The plea was that defendant had allowed clinkers and other debris to
collect along the side of the track so as to make the yards unsafe and that plaintiff had slipped on a
clinker. The Georgia court held this an insufficient allegation of negligence; the Supreme Court reversed.
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entirely ignored. The advance sheets teem with negligence appeals. Reversals for
lack of evidence are not uncommon. Indeed recently the Supreme Court upheld the

judgment of a court of appeals in an FELA case setting aside a verdict for lack
of evidence.5 There appeared to be no reason whatever for that august tribunal even
to hear this case on certiorari. Perhaps certiorari was taken so that the Court might
make somewhat ostentatious vindication of the power of the courts of appeals to
preserve the tattered remnants of the older view.

But these spasmodic reaffirmations of the traditional law of negligence meet with
disapproval and even at times with almost angry protest. Mr. Justice Black appears

to believe that the sufficiency of the evidence is exclusively for the jury, at least if it
is possible to imagine some theory of negligence.' His view does not reject the
linguistics of negligence, but it denies the power of the judge to control the jury, a

feature which is accepted for civil trials generally, and, so one would suppose, for
negligence trials. I do not think that it is presumptuous to infer that for Mr.
Justice Black negligence should not be a necessary predicate for recovery, at least
by an employee against his employer. Of course that view is almost universally
held in so far as it is embodied in an explicitly prescribed insurance scheme of
workmen's compensation. But Mr. Justice Black is prepared to take a similar view
of the tort action and so as it were to assert that one who is the victim of an insurable risk is justly entitled to recover.
Professor Fleming James has expressed 7 much the same feeling about liability
for automobile injuries in an interesting but somewhat obscure thesis built around
the concept of "accident proneness." His point appears to be that since negligence
is attributable to accident proneness, and accident proneness is a character trait,
a patterned way of responding, the concept of negligence is emptied of any
element of blame. It is thought then to follow that since blame is absent, the
concept of negligence is without significance either to create liability or to defeat
it (contributory negligence). Essentially, of course, this is nothing other than
a new and fashionable garb for determinism. That fault has become a deeply
ingrained habit does not in the slightest negative the accepted notion of fault.
Whether fault is an effect of free will is a question that each decides for himself,
'but the law, following the common instinct, treats fault as a moral dictum
and not less so because it has become habitual. There is, however, no denying that
for most of us the question of the individual's moral responsibility for fault arouses
deep and discomforting metaphysical distress. The modern man is thus driven to
avoid where possible solutions that invoke the concept of fault.
To some degree this solution has already been achieved by the notion that the
'Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 340 U. S. 573 (1951). (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting.) Other
recent cases holding evidence insufficient are Jaroszewski v. Central R. R., 9 N. J. 231, 87 A. 2d 705
(1952), cert. denied, 73 SUP. Ct. 26 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Thomas,
198 F. 2d 783 (4th Cir. 1952) (2-I); Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. R., 164 F. 2d 996 '(3rd Cir. 1947)
(2-i), aff'd, 335 U. S. 329 (1948) (5-4)' Note his votes in the cases cited in note 5, supra.
'James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 769 (1950).
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standard for judging the defendant's conduct is not his own but the "reasonable
man's." In the majority of cases, however, the discourse concerning due care is in
terms which the ordinary man would accept as his own, and were the standard
seriously applied a defendant would be judged by the criteria which he more or less
applies to his own affairs. But, even so, in the ordinary negligence case it is not the
fault of the defendant which accounts for the law's concern; it is the injury to plaintiff. The defendant's fault (beyond the important fact of his bare connection with
the plaintiff's injury) provides the law with a basis for compensating the plaintiff. It
has become increasingly obvious that certain activities create foreseeable risks which
society can afford to insure. If plaintiff has suffered injury of the foreseeable type,
it seems that insurability is a much better reason for compensation than fault in the
pallid sense in which it is now understood. And it has the superior virtue that the
plaintiff recovers in every case.8
If then the judges have not entirely abandoned negligence they are under great
pressure to do so from within and from without. Sensitive judges are caught in
a dreadful cross-fire. The common law and statute enjoin them to talk the language of fault and to administer it in customary ways. Yet there is a pervasive
atmosphere constantly suggesting that adherence to the concept is anachronistic
and reactionary. This makes for continuous erosion both in doctrine and administration. It is this question of liability to which lawyers, judges, and scholars have
for the most part directed their attention. But the question of damages on the other
hand has had as yet very little attention. When liability rests on insurability rather
than on notions of fault, there arise, as it seems to me, questions as to the rationalization of certain principles of compensation which are at present taken for granted.
II
I suggest that the crucial controversy in personal injury torts today is not in the
area of liability but of damages. Questions of liability have great doctrinal fascination. Questions of damage-and particularly their magnitude-do not lend themselves so easily to discourse. Professors dismiss them airily as matters of trial administration. Judges consign them uneasily to juries with a minimum of guidance,
occasionally observing loosely that there are no rules for assessing damages in
personal injury cases.9 There is analogy for this situation in Jerome Frank's complaint that fact finding, though of paramount importance, is neglected by teachers
who devote themselves too exclusively to appellate law. This may reflect not so
' Clarence Morris warns us that we must not assume that an enterprise defendant is necessarily
in a better position than plaintiff to insure. Hazardous Enterprises & Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE
L. J. 1172 (1952). Thus, fire risk is ordinarily more effectively and more bearably insured by plaintiff.
This is the reason behind two much maligned cases which have always seemed to me correctly decided.
Ryan v. New York Central Ry., 35 N. Y. 2io, 91 Am. Dec. 49 (1866); Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N. Y. 16o, 159 N. E. 896 (1928). However, in neither of these cases do the opinions proceed
frankly on this basis, and it is the rationalizations which have given offense.
'In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Withers, x92 Va. 493, 51o, 65 S. E. 2d 654, 663 (951), the court
quoted the following from an earlier Virginia decision: "The settled rule is that, as there is no legal
measure of damages in cases involving personal injuries, the verdict of the jury in such cases cannot
be set aside as excessive .... "
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much their judgment of relative importance (as Judge Frank supposes) as the
relative adaptability of the subjects to conceptualization. And so it probably is with
the subject of damages.
The size of the personal injury verdict has increased enormously in the last few
years."0 A number of factors have combined to swell it. The earliest of these has
been the movement for the recognition and fuller protection of the imponderable
interests of personality: freedom from mental distress-pain, sorrow, anxiety, irritation- in so far as these have been the consequences of socially unjustified activity.
Judicial and legislative resistance to these demands has been considerably disarmed.
This has coincided with a higher standard of living, a growing sense of entitlement
to "security" (both of these resting on a constant rise in productivity), and finally
a persistent inflation. These factors by reaction on each other multiply the
product. Our concern about "security" grows as our stake in it grows and this in
turn increases sensitivity to inflation. Here is a fertile field for pressure, a hothouse
for "forcing."
We have come to accept almost without question the monetary evaluation of
the immeasurable perturbations of the spirit. But why should the law measure in
monetary terms a loss which has no monetary dimension? If A takes B's chattel he
should return it or pay for it; if he destroys it he has had his way with B's goods and
should pay. At least this seems clear where A's conduct is blameworthy. A has or
has had what is B's and if the law can return to B the chattel or its equivalent it is
acting on the maxim to each his own. The case provides an analogy for a case
involving a total or partial destruction of B's earning power. If A's act was innocent, under the modern law he has not had to pay. Though in a sense he may be
said to have taken away, he has not received anything. Where, however, he has
wrongfully deprived B of his earning power the law can and will order him to
return its equivalent. But what of the apprehension of injury, and the pain and
suffering of it? At this point the analogy to the deprivation of a valued good
breaks down. This is clearly true of suffering which is in the past. It is less true
for pain still to be faced. The pain I have suffered may leave me a better or a
worse man, it may leave me with a memory of pain or a sense of gratitude for pain
departed. To put a monetary value on the unpleasant emotional characteristics
of experience is to function without any intelligible guiding premise.
When the defendant's conduct is reprehensible damages are an apt instrument
of punishment." The criminal law is often a clumsy and ineffective device for
dealing with unsocial activity. The engines of public prosecution may be too
10The lournal of the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys (NACCA) publishes lists of verdicts of over $S5o,ooo. Its list is often referred to by courts to justify large verdicts.
This Association is, as the name implies, an association of "plaintiff" attorneys. There have, of course,
for many years been associations of insurance attorneys and agents whose activities and journals are
devoted to the minimization of liability. The NACCA is a "countervailing" trade journal devoted to
maximizing liability and, if understood to be such, serves a useful informative and argumentative
function.
1 There are valuable thoughts and citations on exemplary damages in Professor Ehrenzweig's report
for the New York Law Revision Commission: MUsrsLE DAMAoEs, LE. Doc. (1944) No. 65 (J).
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ponderous or too busy with high crimes. The tort law serves as a useful supplement or alternative. To pay money to one's victim is a salutary humiliation. The

victim is the focus of the communal sense of having been wronged. The receipt
of money particularly from the wrongdoer assuages a justified sense of outrage.
It is true that here the law does operate without any adequate premise for measurement or alternative. To pay money to one's victim is a salutary humiliation. The
as society holds that punishment serves a useful function. It is perhaps possible
to provide a measure by relating monetary punishment to the size of the defendant's
income. 2 Many courts arbitrarily restrict punitive damages, probably a wise expedient in an area where there is no guide to judgment.' 3
Rationalization becomes more obscure and wavering when the defendant's conduct is merely negligent rather than willful. It is customarily said that the purpose
of a tort action is compensation rather than punishment, particularly where the gist
of the action is negligence. When the plaintiff's damage is restricted to mental
distress the courts have quite consistently denied any recovery but once given
physical injury as a predicate, pain and suffering is allowed as "parasitic damage. '
The court will invariably admit that there is no measure for its valuation but it is
thought that justice nevertheless demands its equation into money. In a recent
FELA case"o $40,000 was allowed for pain and suffering. It, might just as well
have been $io,ooo or $iooooo, though a court sometimes by an intuitive judgment,
sometimes by rote, will set limits. A factor of such dimensions and yet so subject
'2-In tort cases involving a punitive element many courts allow a showing of the defendant's wealth,
though some do not. E.g., Pendleton v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 82 W. Va. 27o, 95 S. E. 941 (C918),
annotated i6 A. L. R. 771 (1922). See discussion in Wilson v. Onondaga Radio Broadcasting Corp.,
175 Misc. 389, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 194o) disapproving of evidence as to defendant's wealth.
More rarely do courts consider the defendant's poverty in reducing damages. E.g., Jackson v. Briede,
156 La. 573, 100 So. 722, 726 (1924).

Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige, 15 LAw & CoraTMP. PROB. 445, 447 (i95o), notes that some of the
European codes permit the court to consider relative wealth in assessing damages in tort cases; the idea
is not restricted to cases of punitive damages.
" See notes in x6 A. R. L. 761 (1922), 123 A. L. R. 1i36 (1939), 17 A. L. R. 2d 527 (1951).
" Itwill be remembered that Street in a well-known passage in his The Foundationsof Legal Liability(Vol. I,at 470 (i9o6)) said in speaking of "mental distress":
to a transitory
factor belongs essentially
"The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic
stage of legalevolution. A factor which istoday recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be
recognized as an independent basis of liability. It ismerely a question of social, economic, and inin the organic law."
-dustrial needs as those needs are reflected
At Page 475, Street asks whether a recognition of mental distress does answer to "the needs of a
complex and enlightened society." He seems to doubt it. He quotes Lurton, J., dissenting in Wadsworth v. Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 721, 8 S.W. 574, 582-583 (1888):
"Such injuries are generally more sentimental than substantial, depending largely upon physical
and nervous condition. The suffering of one under precisely the same circumstances would be no test of
the suffering of another. Vague and shadowy, there isno possible standard by which such an injury
can be justly compensated, or even approximately measured. Easily simulated and impossible to disprove, it falls within all of the objections to speculative damages . . . That damages so imaginary, so
metaphysical, so sentimental, shall be ascertained and assessed by a jury, with justness, not by way of
punishment to the defendant, but as mere compensation to the plaintiff, is not to be expected."
In so far as Street's pronouncement involved a prophecy it has come true only in part. Mental distress is still not an independent basis of liability in negligence actions but the elimination of the
requirement of "contact" leads to that result.
"5Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 386 F. 2d 926 ( 9 th Cir. 1951) discussed in the text infra.
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to whim would appear to call for a fairly convincing rationalization. The reasoning often used is that plaintiff has in fact suffered "something," an injury, and
defendant, a wrongdoer, should not be excused merely because this something has
no determinable monetary equivalent. This reasoning does not necessarily rest on a
premise of punishment. The fault of the defendant is pointed to in order to justify
compensation for the plaintiff's loss and particularly to counter the suggestion that
the law should not make a finding for which there is no standard of judgment. It
is the defendant, the argument runs, who has created the predicament. He cannot
complain.
But why we may ask should the plaintiff be compensated in money for an
experience which involves no financial loss? It cannot be on the principle of
returning what is his own. Essentially that principle rests on an economic foundation: on maintaining the integrity of the economic arrangements which provide
the normally expectable basis for livelihood in our society. Pain is a harm,
an "injury," but neither past pain nor its compensation has any consistent economic significance. The past experience is not a loss except in so far as it produced present deterioration. It will be said, however, that these arguments betray
a limited, a Philistine view of the law's concern, one that the law has happily transcended. This objection mistakes the argument. Of course the law is concerned,
and properly so, with other than economic interests. The criminal law and the
tort law in so far as punitive (that is to say in so far as the conduct of the plaintiff
warrants punishment) is much concerned with the protection of non-economic interests; and to punishment may be added judicial remedies of a preventive character such as the injunction against nuisances, invasions of privacy, etc., and legislative devices such as zoning.
I am aware, however, that though the premise may elude detection, some
deep intuition may claim to validate this process of evaluating the imponderable.
One who has suffered a violation of his bodily integrity may feel a sense of continuing outrage. This is particularly true where there has been disfigurement or
loss of a member (even though not giving rise to economic loss). Because our society sets a high value on money it uses money or price as a means of recognizing
the worth of non-economic as well as economic goods. If, insists the plaintiff, society really values my personality, my bodily integrity, it will signify its sincerity by
paying me a sum of money. Damages thus may somewhat reestablish the plaintiff's
self-confidence, wipe out his sense of outrage. Furthermore, though money is not
an equivalent it may be a consolation, a solatium. These arguments, however, are
most valid for disfigurements or loss of member giving rise to a continuing sense of
injury. (And in such cases there may be potential economic injury which cannot
be established.) It is doubtful that past pain figures strongly as present outrage.
And even granting these arguments there must be set over against them the arbitrary indeterminateness of the evaluation. Insurance aside, it is doubtful justice
seriously to embarrass a defendant, though negligent, by real economic loss in order

DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY

225

to do honor to plaintiff's experience of pain. And insurance present, it is doubtful
that the pooled social fund of savings should be charged with sums of indeterminate
amount when compensation performs no specific economic function. This consideration becomes the stronger as year after year the amounts set aside for the security
account become a larger proportion of the national income.
It is not supposed, however, that even were the reasons of the best-and mine
I am sure will fail to satisfy many-the courts will forthwith deny the right of the
plaintiff to have these intangibles valued. But putting aside for the moment their
bearing on legislation, I would suggest that they are not irrelevant to the judicial
creation of new remedies and new items of damage; nor to the judicial administration of present items of damage.
A wry history of the attempt to measure-to "quantify" as the English judges
have it--the immeasurable is found in a group of English cases dealing with dam6
ages for "the loss of expectation of life." In Flint v. Lovell the plaintiff, a "more
or less wealthy" man of 7o,had been negligently injured and his expectation of life
shortened by 8 years (as it then seemed).' 7 He was given only a year to live.
The trial court awarded him C4ooo for the loss of "8 years of pleasant living."
8
In 1937 the meaning of this decision was tested in Rose v. Fordi Mabel Rose,
a young woman of 23, was negligently injured, became unconscious almost at once,
and died four days later. An action was brought by her administrator under the
Law Reform Act of 1934 which for the first time provided for the survival of an
action of a deceased. A majority of the judges of the Court of Appeal thought
that Flint v. Lovell was inapplicable because Miss Rose was never aware that her
expectation had been shortened. If damages were to be awarded they agreed that
£iooo would be a fair amount. But the House of Lords would not have it so.
The action was for such damages as Miss Rose could have collected had she lived.
Said Lord Wright, "A man has a legal right that his life should not be shortened
by the tortious act of another. His normal expectancy of life is a thing of temporal
value.... .""1 The Lords were not unaware of the difficulty of the task. Damages
should be assessed in "a moderate way." The jury should use "common sense" and
give "what is fair and moderate, in view of all the uncertainties and contingencies
of human life. Special cases may occur, such as that of an infant or an imbecile
2
or an incurable invalid or a person involved in hopeless difficulties."
"a [i935] r K. B. 354- Sir Frederick Pollock commenting on the case at the time (51 L. Q. Rev.
268 (1935)) asserted that though "the expectation of life is a thing of temporal value" and the loss
of it an admissible element of damage, one cannot say that the shortening of one's own life is a detriment.
"... it is not possible for any human tribunal to attach any definite meaning to the term or, for that
matter, to say whether death, when it happens, is in itself a bad or a good thing."
This distinction would probably have made no difference in Flint v. Lovell, but it would be pertinent
to Rose v. Ford, [1937] A. C. 826, when the injured person was unconscious from the time of injury
to the time of death. Pollock doubted whether in any case damages should be awarded on this head
since there was a danger that the plaintiff would be twice compensated for the same detriment.
"The prognosis was made sometime in 1934. As appears in Rose v. Ford, [1937] A. C. 826, he
was still alive in June of 1937. Of course, he would still have suffered the anticipation of death, but
Rose v. Ford makes clear that that is not the element being "quantified."
o.
2
id. at 85
" Id. at 848.
s [1937] A. C. 826.
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But the trial judges thereafter were somehow unable to discover what the
common sense of England was on this head. Was compensation to be in direct
proportion to life expectancy? Was the loss more heavy to the rich than to the
poor? Verdicts ran from C90 to 1200 . And in 1940 the House of Lords had to
be called in to pronounce the dictates of common sense concerning the value of
varying intervals of life's term. 2 ' A trial judge had awarded £r1200 for the loss of
expectancy of a 2/2 year old infant who had been instantly killed. It appeared
to him that the infant had lost at least as much as Miss Rose. The Court of
Appeal refused to disturb the verdict, one of the judges because the problem set was
insoluble. He could not say f1200 was wrong since he had no idea what the
proper figure was. Goddard, L. J., was for reducing the figure to f350. Lord
Chancellor Simon, writing for the House of Lords, thought the problem "more
suitable for discussion in an essay on Aristotelian ethics than in the judgment of a
Court of law, but in view of the earlier authorities, we must do our best to contribute to its solution." 2 Then followed much talk about the factors of happiness
and unhappiness, youth and age, the risks and uncertainties of childhood. In this
linguistic alembic by a process almost alchemical the Lords arrived at the conclusion that £2oo (1) would be "a proper figure." The opinion concludes with a
gentle warning (common sense having proved unreliable) "I trust that the views
of this House . . . may help to set a lower standard of measurement than has
hitherto prevailed for what is in fact incapable of being measured in coin of the
23
realm with any approach to real accuracy.
Nowhere in this whole history is there the glimmer of a suggestion of the social
function which is served by undertaking this task "more suitable for discussion in an
essay on Aristotelian ethics." Lord Wright felt called upon to vindicate the
propositions that a man has a "legal right" not to have his life shortened tortiously
and that life expectancy is a thing of "temporal value." And if as Flint V. Lovell
held a man still alive could recover for the loss of expectancy (a somewhat more
appealing proposition since here there is at least the motive of a solatium for future
woe), the survival statute should be read as requiring recovery despite death.
The difficulty is certainly not entirely of the court's making. The survival
statutes are themselves the product of an abstract rationalistic reform movement
that continues to operate in the field of torts without regard either to the present
problem or the present trend in solving it. These statutes are passed to abolish
the "outmoded" "arbitrary" rule that personal actions do not survive the death of
either party. It does not of course require any great perspicuity to perceive that the
distinction pursuant to which contract actions survive and tort actions do not is
"arbitrary" at least as generalization. The reasons may be historical ones not clearly
understood,24 perhaps irrelevant if they were. It is not, to paraphrase Holmes, a
"Benham

'aid. at 168.
" Id. at x66.
v. Gambling [194r] A. C. 157.
Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COL. L. REV. 239, 244, 250 (1929).

2 See Winfield, Death As

In

a broad sense the explanation of the distinction may be rather simple. Originally personal actions
were thought of as resting in personal obligation between plaintiff and defendant. They were non-
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sufficient reason to deny a valid claim that the law was so in the time of Henry
IV but neither is it a reason to create a new cause of action that it will eliminate

a distinction which is no longer understood. The satisfaction of the theorists' desire
for elegant jurisprudence should not be purchased with other people's money.
There is no room here to study and criticize the unutterable confusion of
statutes in each state where the deceased has come to his death as a result of negligent injury. What is needed first is an inventory of the legitimate claims which
arise by reason of death. There can be no thought that the arrangements will be
thoroughly logical in terms of any one rationalization. In my opinion the basic
rationalization is to satisfy the legitimate economic expectations which have been

defeated. In some cases death will be a windfall because a fund will be provided
that the deceased could never himself have amassed. In other cases recovery will
fall short. In addition to expectations of long term support which have been
defeated, there may be losses to those who had claims against the deceased because
the suddenness of death will have prevented the deceased from making expectable
security arrangements. It may in short be difficult to evolve precise formulas which
provide for all legitimate economic claims. But I cannot think that putting it to a
jury to evaluate "pain and suffering" or the loss of the expectation of life is a
rational approach to the problem. It means for one thing that the interest of
creditors, heirs, and dependents is made to turn on the particular way in which
deceased came to his death.
If it is said that these vague formulas are used to assuage the feelings of pain
and outrage of the living relatives, we are back again to the question whether
these are proper items of compensation under the present conditions of liability.
This is in some measure the question in another class of cases-those dealing with
the death of small children. In at least one recent case 25 damages were awarded
for the death of a viable foetus. The case is thought to be the occasion for high
jurisprudential speculation as to when and whether a foetus becomes a "personality."
".. . [I]t is but to deny a palpable fact to argue that there is but one life and that
assignable and did not pass to representatives. Exceptions were made by statute or decision as need
or justice appeared to require. Such considerations were less exigent in the type of offense which was
peculiarly personal, i.e., which was an invasion of the plaintiff's personality. Heirs might expect to
inherit the deceased's real and personal property intact but what was personal to the deceased would
inevitably vanish with him.
o Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N. W. 2d 838 (1949). The court admitted that its
ruling was against the great weight of authority. Indeed there appears to be almost no support for
it. See to A. L. I 2d 639 (195o).
A very different question is whether a living child can recover for pre-natal injuries. For some time
the dominant view was against recovery based on Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. B. 567
(1921). The current authority is moving in the other direction: Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349, X02
N. E. 2d 691 (195), overruling, Drobner v. Peters; Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A. 2d 550 (Md. 1951);
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, 208 Ga. 2o, 65 S. E. 2d 909 (195); Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334 (1949). But see Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461,
95 N. E. 2d 2o6 (195o); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N. W. 2d 229 ('95').
It is a measure of the reasoning in the Verkennes case that it relied on cases allowing a living
child to bring damages for pre-natal injury. In the opinion of the court the question was whether the
viable foetus was a person.
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the life of the mother." But essentially the question is whether social justice dictates

the compensation of the severe emotional distress in the loss of a child. Either
general death or special statutes provide for compensation for the death of a minor
child in terms of "pecuniary loss" or dependency. The most common element
is the net loss to the parents from the loss of services of the decedent during minority.
A strict adherence to this element would in many cases result in a denial of recovery. Where the child is still young costs of nurture will exceed the value of any
expectable services; and in many families very little in the way of services will ever
be demanded or expected. Yet it has been said that some pecuniary loss is presumed.26 Otherwise it is argued, the statute would be rendered "nugatory."27 One
can only wonder what this means. If the purpose of the statute is to punish fault
the observation is just but not if it is to compensate pecuniary loss. In judicial reactions of this sort we have strong evidence of the prevailing institutional confusion
in the compensation of personal injury. One, of course, should expect a "skew" at
this point. The death of a minor child is not only one of the most excruciating of
distresses but one which most easily evokes sympathy. Generosity vouches for the
sincerity of the emotion. Through the lawsuit the experience of sorrow can be
transmuted into a personalized struggle between right and wrong. The defendant,
however minimal his misdoing, is the sacrificial scapegoat, his pelf is the pledge of
our sincerity.
The recent case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co S is another instance where decision
is made to turn on a series of fashionable propositions quite divorced from their
function in the current scene. There the court held that a wife could recover from
her husband's employer for a negligent injury to the husband which disabled him
from sexual intercourse. It has been the law that the hubsand can recover for the
loss of "consortium," though usually as an element of loss of service. It has also
been the law that both can recover for intentional interference. These propositions
being so the court could see no reason for denying the wife recovery in a case of
negligence. It pointed to the fact that women have been emancipated. It ridiculed
the reasons given for the distinction, e.g., that the injury to the wife is indirect;
that the husband's suit is based primarily on the loss of service whereas the wife
does not have such an action. It expatiated on the "modern concepts of the marital
" See Van Cleave v. Lynch, iog Utah 149, 166 P. 2d 244 (r946), upholding a verdict of Sio,ooo
for death of a 6 year old boy, the court admitting that damages were primarily for loss of society, etc.
and reviewing a number of verdicts in other cases, two of them for $,5,ooo.
In Couch v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 8o Cal. App. 857, 183 P. 2d gi (947), a verdict of
$27,500 for death of a child of so months was reduced to $i5,ooo and allowed to stand.
In Immel v. Richards, 154 Ohio St. 54, 93 N. E. 2d 474 (1950), the jury awarded $5,ooo for the
death of a 9 months old child. The award was upheld, Taft, J., dissenting, on the ground that there
was no evidence from which to make such a finding in terms of the statute's criterion of "pecuniary

injury."
In Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Ida. 463, 220 P. 2d 682 (195o), a verdict of $40,000 for death of a child
of 9 years was reduced to $2o,ooo and allowed to stand at that. See infra for the interesting sequel
to this case.
'1 Sweeten v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 88 Wash. 679, 153 Pac. 1054 (1915).
.83

F. 2d 8i

(Dist. Col. 195o), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 852 (1950).
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relations." The wife is permitted to recover for a willful interference. If the loss of
consortium is protected against willful interference it "must be predicated on a
legally protected interest." And if it is "legally protected" it must equally be protected against negligent interference. To distinguish is "neither legal nor logical."
But the law, of course, often distinguishes between willful and negligent interference
as in the cases of emotional distress. An interest is protected only in so far as it serves
a social purpose to protect it. When the act is willful the law may award damages
for penal purposes. But more basically the law quite properly recognizes that a willful assault on the personality inflicts a far more serious blow. It is almost unthinkable that a court should reduce consortium to the bare element of the opportunity
for sexual intercourse and pretend to see no basic difference of offense to the wife's
interest between the incidental loss of that opportunity and the deliberate destruction
of the whole marital relationship.
More persuasive is the argument that since the husband has an action, so should
the wife. But his action is a fossil from an earlier era. It is one of a group of
archaic actions based on the notion that the paterfamilias was alone competent to
sue for losses suffered by the family unit. The husband was entitled to his wife's
service and this included the sentimental elements of her person and presence. The
law did not seek to set a value on consortium29 as such. When to the husband's
action, there is now added the wife's action for negligent injuries (which being
emancipated she is entitled to bring) there is a danger of duplicating elements of
damage. Ingenious efforts must be made to disentangle from the wife's recovery
the constituents of the husband's cause of action. Indeed, the emancipation argues
for the restriction or abolition of these actions rather than their extension. Some
courts have been bold enough entirely to abolish the husband's action;30 and one
has restricted the husband to the loss of services previously enjoyed, refusing to allow
loss of consortium to be valued in either direction.'
It is still no doubt an element of recovery that the plaintiff has been incapacitated for intercourse; 32 but in
any scheme of compensation, impairment of function presents a stronger claim than
the sorrow or disappointment of relatives and friends.
It was argued also in the Hitafler case that the compensation act was intended
to cover the entire obligation of the employer arising from the employee's injury.
This argument has since prevailed in three jurisdictions33 and had the court been
troubled simply by the formal inequality of husband and wife it might be thought
- See the excellent opinion in Marri v. Stamford Street R. R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 A. 582 (911).
0Marri v. Stamford Street R. R., supra note 29; Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420,
93 N. E. 389 (x91o); Helmsteder v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1945).
"5 Felton v. Wedthoff, 385 Mich. 72, 15 N. W. 727 (1915).
But in Felton v. Wedthoff, supra note 31, where a husband had been hospitalized, the court
refused to permit a valuation of the separation from his wife. The court said rather broadly that loss
of consortium would no longer be valued. It appears to be a well-established doctrine in the federal
courts that diminutions of family pleasures, e.g., ability to play with one's children, are not compensable
and, therefore, it is error to put in evidence that one has a wife or children. See Slattery v. Marra
Bros., i86 F. 2d 134, 337 (2d Cir. I95- ).
55
'Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 356 Ohio St. 295, 3o2 N. E. 2d 444 (1951); Napier v. Martin, 250
S. W. 2d 35 (Tenn. 1952); Guse v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 260 Wis. 403, 51 N. W. 2d 24 (952).
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that it would have gladly taken this way out. But says the court, "... it would
be contrary to reason to hold that this Act cuts off independent rights of third
persons.... A brief examination of it will reveal that there is no provision therein
for compensating a spouse for the loss of consortium." 4 A somewhat less brief
examination of the statute will reveal that the interests of spouse and children are
within its ambit. The statute has in mind the husband or the wife as the head of
a family or as one having dependents.
One journal approving Hitafler v. Argonne Co. has this to say:35
Courts are living in a practical world and must recognize the facts of life. Here was
a healthy man, living with his wife and enjoying normal sexual relationships. Along
comes an employer who by negligence makes those sexual relationships impossible.
In this statement we have a striking and illuminating example of the playing
of both ends against the middle which is characteristic in this field. When the
question is proof of negligence every argument is mustered to eliminate a requirement that negligence be proved in a sense that would support a finding of moral
delinquency. It is emphasized that the action is compensatory rather than punitive.
As we have seen, Professor James' thesis of "accident proneness" attempts completely to destroy the frame of moral reference. The more usual insistence on
negligence as the departure from the objective "standard" moves in the same direction. The availability of insurance makes it increasingly difficult to insist on
the relevance of the standard of due care. The most trivial departures from an
assumed standard serve to move the case past the judge to the jury. Once the propriety of this approach to the question of liability is insisted upon it is disingenuous
to place much weight on fault as a specific factor justifying damages.
The above quotation particularly emphasizes the point. In its subtly anthropomorphic version of the employer it is doubly disingenuous. Employers in these
times almost never "come along," because they are corporations. It is a fellow
employee who has been negligent. There will be some who read this assertion with
horror; it may appear to revive the unhallowed spectre of the "fellow servant rule."
And it will be asked, too, whether the author has ever heard of respondeat superior.
Holmes, it will be recalled, 6 thought that the doctrine of respondeat superior was
a mere remnant of patriarchal notions of identification, survival of a time when
wife, child, and servant were in "the power" of the husband, father, and master;
when indeed the servant was a slave without personality, forfeitable if he injured
another as a noxious thing which the master by paying could redeem. Amazingly
Holmes could find no reason or basis in modern law for charging an employer with
34183 F. 2d at 820.
355 NACCA L. J. 2oi (i95o) (italics supplied). Cf. the indignation expressed in 8 NACCA L. J.
119 (195r), over a decision denying damages under FELA to the non-dependent adult children of a
negligently killed worker: "To allow a railroad, negligently killing a father, to escape all liability . . .
is unjust.... Had the railroad killed a valuable hunting dog, substantial damages would be allowed.
"NACCA hopes some day that the courts will find a way of compensating adult, self-supporting
children; or that Congress will so order by an amendment to the FELA." To what end?
"AgencY, 4 H v. L. RIv. 345, 5 HARv. L. REv. x (i8gi).
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the employee's torts. If by that doctrine one seeks to prove that the employer is a
tortious wrongdoer he would indeed be invoking a fiction of identification7 But
it is now common ground both that the doctrine involves no fiction if correctly

understood and that it is perfectly sound and desirable. The entrepreneur liable
for his employee's negligent act is charged not because he "came along" but because he assumes to embark upon an enterprise creating certain risks for which
he may make provision. Because he is in this position he is better able than the
injured party to bear the loss. It would be an anachronism, no doubt, to suppose
that the doctrine arose or was initially preserved in response to so explicit a formulation. Yet is one not entitled to suppose that some such ideas were dimly felt
long before they were expounded? In any case this is its rationalization for our
times; this is its function. When we put the situation thus, it is no longer open
to us to justify an award to the wife on the premise that she has been victimized
by the employer corporation. We must ask, rather, whether placing a money value
on this sorrow serves a sufficiently valuable function to make it a legitimate charge
against the national insurance funds.
Some of this same confusion, incidentally, is found in the cases dealing with
recoveries by plaintiffs for items of damage which they would have suffered had
they not been insured or had they not been the recipient of a gift. In the early New
York case of Drinkwater v. Dinsmore3" the plaintiff injured by the servants of the
defendant was denied damages for loss of wages because his employer had voluntarily paid them. "This was not a case for exemplary damages," said the court.
"The plaintiff was entitled to recover, in addition to what a jury might award him
for his suffering and physical injuries, only his pecuniary loss."'" This appears a
sensible view, but it has been nearly universally condemned. 40 It is said to relieve
the "wrongdoer" from the consequences of his wrong, to give him a windfall. In
the minds of those who thus argue it is as if the negligent act had some specific
monetary dimension of wrongfulness4 1 rather than simply providing the basis for
" In some jurisdictions penal damages may be awarded against the corporation for the misconduct
of a servant however lowly. See McCospmicK, DAMAGES 285 (1935).
In an interesting recent case, Haser v. Pape, 50 N. W. ad 240 (N. D. i95i), a taxicab company
was held liable for rape committed by a driver. On the first trial a verdict of $io,ooo was returned
against the driver (verdict directed in favor of taxicab company). On reversal of the direction in
favor of the company a retrial against the company alone resulted in a verdict of $650. This the trial
judge set aside as inadequate and his ruling was sustained. In a subsequent suit against the company's
insurer on the $So,ooo verdict against the driver it was held that provisions in the insurance contract
excluding liability for positive misconduct would be effective at least in so far as the liability of the
driver was concerned. The question was left open as to whether it would exclude liability of the
company, since it was under a statutory duty to insure. Haser v. Maryland Casualty Co., 53 N. W. 2d
5o8 (N. D. 1952).
5
" 8o N. Y. 390, 36 Am. Rep. 624 (188O).
Id. at 392, 36 Am. Rep. at 625.
"0See Landon v. United States, 197 F. 2d x28 (2d Cir. 1952). A note however in 63 HI-tv. L. REv.
330 (1949), takes the view proposed in the text. It points out that the majority doctrine confuses
a penal with a compensatory view. And at 337 it states more broadly ". . . if the ultimate cost of certain
torts or breaches of contract is to be paid by society, the rules of damages must be readjusted."
" See, e.g., Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 374, 214 N. W. 374, 376 (1927), where the court
talks about the "wrongful acts of the tort-feasor" and states that "the extent of the liability of the
wrongdoer is dependent upon the extent of the injuries inflicted by his wrongful act...
Yet here
not the defendant but his servants were negligent.
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the plaintiff's well-being. Where the plaintiff's pay or hospitalization is insured
or guaranteed by contract there is an argument that a deduction would deprive the
plaintiff of a contractual interest for which he has paid and give the defendant the
benefit of something for which he had not paid.4 2 Even here an appropriate statutory scheme would require the defendant to pay the insurance fund and thus reduce the insurance cost rather than give the plaintiff a double recovery; and this
is the principle which now generally prevails in workmen's compensation and fire
insurance.
We have so far been dealing with substantive problems. Let us turn for a
moment to judicial administration. In Aflolder v.New York, C. & St. L. R. R.,48
the plaintiff, 35 years of age, lost his leg. He had been earning $400 per month; he
had an expectancy of 37 years. He suffered pain and could be expected to suffer
further pain; he would need more surgery. He would need an articifical limb of
a special type. The jury awarded him $95,000. The trial judge reduced the verdict
to $89,ooo. He calculated a 6o per cent loss of earning power for a total loss of
$70,0oo.
He compared other cases dealing with loss of leg. There should, he
thought, be some uniformity. In 1944 a verdict of $6o,ooo had been reduced to
$4o,o0o.m"

No one, admitted the judge, can evaluate "with any degree of accuracy

what amount of money will compensate plaintiff for the pain and suffering he has
sustained" but "we cannot escape the belief in this case that the sum agreed upon
by the jury exceeds what has heretofore been determined to be a fair sum."4 The
remittitur was made. On appeal by the railroad the court said, "The assignment
of error that the verdict is excessive is not properly addressed to this court." ' And
finally the Supreme Court said, "We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
amount of damages awarded by the District Court's judgment is not monstrous..

."47

This word "monstrous" is the only recent contribution of the Supreme Court
to a question which has split the federal courts of appeals for some time."8 Most
of them hold the doctrine that a court of appeals is without authority to review a
claim that damages are "excessive." ". . . the amount of a verdict is primarily a
42 The note writer in 63 HAsv. L. REv., supra note 40, argues that even so the insurance is not a
saving but a purchase of security. Would a completely logical view be to charge the cost of premiums
to the defendant?
4379 F. Supp. 365 (E. D. Mo. 1948).
"'See Cunningham v. Pennsylvania R. R., 55 F. Supp. 1012 (E. D. N. Y. '944).

A 79 F. Supp. at 370.

46 New York, C. & St. L. R. R. v. Affolder, 174 F. 2d 486, 493 (8th Cir. 1949).
' T Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R. R., 339 U. S. 96, ioi (xg5o). The court of appeals, however,
had not so characterized the reason for its ruling.
' Southern Ry. v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80, 87 (94) is authority for the proposition that "a case of
mere excess upon the evidence is a matter to be dealt with by the trial court. It does not present a
question for reexamination here upon a writ of error." (Italics supplied.) It has been thought that
this limitation on the power of the appellate court may have arisen from the fact that on writ of error
only the judgment roll came up and that under the old practice the record thus did not contain motions
for new trial or the rulings on them. Hand, J., in Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F. 2d 463 (2d
Cir. 1930); but Brandeis, J., in Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U. S. 474 (1933)
explains that the writ of error is no longer restricted and if the appellate court cannot pass on a claim of
excess it is now for other reasons.

DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY

233

factual evaluation on inabsolute elements, while our function has been regarded as
extending only to a testing of the soundness of the processes by which such a
result has been achieved."49 Motions to set aside a verdict as excessive are to be
addressed solely to the discretion of the trial judge. Courts that hold to this view,
however, may point to an excessive verdict as showing that error has been prejudicial." And it is generally said that an excessive verdict may suggest the influence of "passion and prejudice"; however, courts are hesitant so to convict a jury
unless counsel has interjected elements of passion and prejudice. The fourth and
ninth circuits, however, claim a limited authority to review "excessiveness as such."51
In the recent case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie52 the verdict was for $iooooo.
The court of appeals was of the opinion that no more than $6o,ooo of this was attributable to loss of earnings, though conceivably the jury's calculation of loss of
earnings was $70,000.

This left $40,000 for intangibles.

This verdict said the court

was "too high." But does the court of appeals have power ever to order a remittitur?
"Yes," said all except one member of the court. The Affolder case was thought to
imply such a power.3 But said a majority of the judges the power could be exercised only if the verdict was "monstrous" which interpreted means "grossly excessive"; and $40,000 for pain and suffering was not "grossly excessive." With this
conclusion three of the judges disagreed. In Denman's opinion if the amount is
"substantially" more than appellant should pay it is a denial of justice to make him
pay; he is being required to pay more than he "owes." 4 Said Stephens, J., 55
I cannot go along with the so-called "monstrous" doctrine. It seems to me that by adopting it we give up all attempt to square the judgment with a reasonable basis for its
support. I would think a million dollar judgment for the loss of a little finger would
be monstrous (though I have none to sell at that figure) but I don't know about a ten
or twenty thousand dollar judgment. .

.

. I cannot believe that our system of juris-

prudence places everybody's material fortune, such as our free enterprise enables us to
accumulate, at the unbridled whim of any twelve men and women....
"See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Ferguson, 182 F. 2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1950). In Fairmount
Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U. S. 474 (1933), Brandeis, J., noted (at 485) "This Court
has frequently refrained from disturbing the trial court's approval of an award of damages which
seemed excessive or inadequate, and the circuit courts of appeals have generally followed a similar
policy. Whether refusal to set aside a verdict for failure to award substantial damages may ever be reviewed on the ground that the trial judge abused his discretion, we have no occasion to determine."
(The Fairmount case dealt with an inadequate verdict.)
" St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Ferguson, supra note 49. Here plaintiff's counsel improperly suggested to the jury that defendant had sought to suppress evidence, etc.
"1Cobb v. Lepisto, 6 F. 2d i28 ( 9th Cir. 1925); Virginian Ry. v. Armentrout, 166 F. 2d 400 ( 4 th
Cir. 1948).
5 I86 F. 2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 904 (195).
"'The eighth circuit (whose decision was reviewed in the lffolder case) expresses doubt whether
that case meant to imply a power to review for excessiveness. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Ferguson,
182 F. 2d 949 (8th Cir. 1950). But in Missouri-K-T-R Co. of Texas v. Ridgway, 191 F. 2d 363 (8th
Cir. 1951) the court said that whether the verdict was "monstrous" it need not decide; it was however
"so excessive as to shock the conscience." On that basis it held that certain improper appeals to the
jury by plaintiffs counsel were reversible error; even that stops short of reducing a verdict simply because
excessive.

z86 F. 2d at 933.
x'
Id.at 934.
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The following year a division of the ninth circuit"6 did hold that a verdict of
$35,000 for the death of an 8 year old son was "monstrous" and ordered a remittitur
7
of $I5,ooo. 5
This difference between the courts of appeals is probably one of degree. The
Supreme Court's epithetical "monstrous" implies that a verdict may be so large that
a refusal to set it aside is an abuse of discretion. It is in the nature of the problem
that it is almost impossible to give further character to the notion of "monstrous"
or "grossly excessive." Perhaps the touchstone is initial shock and astonishment
that a jury could so decide or a belief that juries generally would have given far
less. Perhaps it is the ratio between the economic loss and the award for intangibles.
It is enough for some of the judges of the ninth circuit that the verdict is very much
larger than it "should" be; and that the defendant is thereby being required to pay
more than he "owes"; there is in this form of rationalization an implication of an
absolute touchstone which, I am afraid, will elude detection.
What is clear, I think, is that the majority approach to the problem of appellate
control tends toward the progressive maximization of damages. This statement may
appear to be a truism, since in any one case the refusal of the appellate court to intercede will always mean that damages are not reduced. But it would be at least
logically possible for a trial judge to control damages as closely as an appellate body.
Yet in fact we would not expect that to happen. The trial judge is subject to the
same influences as the jury: the presence of the plaintiff in the courtroom, the
dramatization of his predicament, the impersonality of the defendant, so often incorporated or insured or both. And the trial judge is further influenced by the jury
itself. He has established a personal relation with them. He may not wish to
appear either to them or to himself less generous, less understanding, or less sympathetic. These factors, in my opinion, point toward the soundness of the attitude
expressed by the ninth circuit judges in Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie. There may
be no absolute basis upon which the appellate judges can exercise their control but
they can introduce an element of measure and uniformity, a particularly desirable
objective in an area of insurability.
I suspect that underlying the somewhat confused and latitudinarian judicial approach in these damage matters is the contingent fee. It is clearly established in this
country that lawyers' costs are not recoverable by the winning party. As long as this
is true, plaintiff's recovery will be reduced from 20 per cent to 50 per cent. Thus,
however carefully calculated the plaintiff's economic loss, the plaintiff's "take-home"
may be substantially less. No court without working a drastic change in the law
can overtly make an allowance for the lawyer's fee. But until our system of com" Two of three were Denman and Stephens.
"Covey Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts, 187 F. 2d 561 (gth Cir. i95i). The case had involved what
Denman characterized as "forum shopping." The plaintiff had first procured a judgment of $40,000 in
the state court of Idaho; the Idaho Supreme Court had ordered a remittitur of $2o,0o0.
Checketts v.
Bowman, 70 Ida. 463, 220 P. 2d 682 (5950). It is interesting that the two juries awarded $4o,ooo and
$35,0o0 respectively, showing, perhaps, that there is a lay sense as to how such matters should be
evaluated.
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pensation achieves a somewhat more rational form, the award for pain and suffering might be measured and justified in terms of a contribution to the real costs of
the litigation."
The implication of these observations is that if our basis of compensating injury
is shifted implicitly or explicitly from fault to insurability there must be a reconsideration of the kinds of interest which are compensated and the degree of compensation for the interests which are compensable. It seems likely that, as the goal
becomes universal coverage of injury and disease, protection must tend to shrink
toward the minimum level of economic loss. I have tried to show that in the absence of willful misconduct it is particularly difficult to justify damages for past
discomfort. Impairment of function makes a stronger claim. If we turn to a
statutory insurance scheme, workmen's compensation, we find that pain and suffering whether past or future is not compensated except as the existence of pain may
produce partial or total disability to earn.P9 Most statutes, however, contain a
schedule of specific injuries for which compensation is fixed by statute. Even though
the workman is able to resume employment without loss of wages, he recovers the
fixed payment."0 The probabilities, however, are overwhelming that injuries included in the schedule will result in losses of earning power which may not be
demonstrable. A man will often be kept on the payroll despite an injury but
should the maimed individual have to go elsewhere his disability may be an obstacle.
This is particularly true of disfigurement which is compensable under many
statutes."1 But the intention of the statutes is carried further and held to cover
"

Cf.

McCoRMIcK,

DAMAGES 277 (935):

"Another substantial argument for exemplary damages

in the present American procedural system is that the award of such damages remedies, though crudely
and in only a limited class of cases, one of the glaring defects in our system, which is the denial of
compensation for actual expenses of litigation, such as counsel fees, to one who has been forced by
a wrongdoer to establish by litigation the justice of his claims."
" In Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp. v. Manocchia, 89 A. 2d 923 (R. I. 1952) the worker contracted a
skin disease. It was held that as long as the disease was uncured and the discomfort and embarrassment
of working might retard recovery, the worker might remain away from work and recover for temporary
total disability. A dictum stated that once cure was effected, embarrassment was not compensable.
0 Bednar v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 279 N. Y. 8o, 17 N. E. 2zd 777 (938) (one quarter loss of hearing
in one ear; no loss of earnings shown); Florick v. Broad Window Cleaning Co., 243 N. Y. 576, 554 N. E.
6sx (1926); Cameron Coal Co. v. Dunn, 85 Okla. 219, 205 Pac. 503 (1922).
1
" N. Y. WORK. Comps. LAw §15(t) (facial disfigurement; amount discretionary up to $3500);
Laws of Mass. c. 152 §361(h) (bodily disfigurement; amount discretionary up to $2500).
N. M. STAT. ANN. 57-918(b) 1941 ". . . If any workman is seriously permanently disfigured about

the face or head the court may allow such additional sum . . . as it may deem just." In Elkins v.
Lallier, 38 N. M. 316, 32 P. 2d 759 (1934), the claimant lost an eye. The schedule provided ioo
weeks' compensation for loss of sight in one eye; iro weeks for the eye itself. An award for ioo weeks
plus $750 for disfigurement was sustained. The same result was reached in Donahue v. Adams
Transfer & Storage Co., 230 Mo. App. 215, 88 S. W. 2zd 432 (1935).

Some statutes provide that there shall be no compensation for disfigurement, if compensation is
In some recovery may be had if
payable for any other disability: IND. STAr. ANN. 4o-13o3(b)(7) (952).
disfigurement constitutes a separate injury.

ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 148, §145(c) (1942); S. D. CoDE ANN.

64.0403(2) (1939). See Chicago Home for the Friendless v. Industrial Comm., 297 Ill. 286, 13o N. E.
756 (1921) (loss of hand and facial disfigurement); cf. Smith-Lohr Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 291 Ill. 355, x26 N. E. 164 (1920), In Oklahoma both may be had for the same injury.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, 922 (952).
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maimings where there is no known rationalization in terms of economic loss. The
loss of one testicle has moved the judges to impassioned lyric utterance on the nature
of man;"2 it has been held compensable under a statute providing compensation

... where the usefulness of the member or any physical function is permanently
impaired .

or "as an injury known in surgery to be a permanent partial dis-

ability"04 or simply a "disability." 5 In this last case it was held by the board to be
i/io of total disability and as such worth $8oo.
It is a fact well publicized that the payments for maiming are much, much less
than in a negligence action. It will be remembered that in the AfFolder case the
plaintiff, a man of 35 earning $400 per month, lost his leg. The Court fixed his loss
of earning capacity at 6o per cent. The jury awarded him $95,000 which the judge
reduced to $8oooo. Under the New York compensation statute which is one of the
most liberal he would receive for the loss of a leg 2/3 of his weekly salary for 288
weeks or about $17,28o;6 in Indiana where the injury occurred he would receive
$I,ooo;67 in Vermont he would receive $4250.6"
There is then in our system a vast discrepancy between the compensation of an
injury depending on whether one is employed by a manufacturer or an interstate
railroad; or whether one's injury is work-connected or not. The logic of the situation points to a reduction of this discrepancy. It appears likely that a system which

sets the economic loss of a worker at $I7,28o will not see fit to allow four times
that amount to one suffering a similar loss in an automobile accident. To be sure

the negligence requirement, however formal, still does eliminate many claims so
that it could be argued that more generous compensation is feasible. But as compensation has become more general the cost of insurance has been mounting
rapidly and the present scheme of calculating damages will be on the defensive0 9
Workmen's compensation schemes on the other hand are in many jurisdictions on a
0'2The opinion in Hercules Powder Co. v. Morris County Court, 93 N. J. 193, 107 Atd. 433 (1919)
is the best known.
:3 Ibid.
0,

Kostida v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 139 Wash. 629, 247 Pac. 1014 (1926).

"G

Carr v. John W. Rowan Plastering Co., 227 Mo. App. 562, 55 S. W. 2d 723 (1932).

" N. Y. WORK. Comp. LAw, §15(3).

If there were "temporary total disability" beyond 40 weeks

he would receive additional payments, §15(4a), but perhaps not more than $5,ooo, §x5(2).
7 IND. STAT. §40-1303 (Burns 1952): two hundred weeks times 6o per cent of average weekly salary.

In addition he may receive 26 weeks of temporary total disability (6o per cent of average weekly
earning), i.e., $1430. Under the New York law he would receive nothing for the first 40 weeks of
temporary total disability.
es One hundred and seventy weeks times 50 per cent of his average weekly pay but a maximum of
$25 per week. He would also receive $25 per week in addition during the period of total disability
incident to the loss of the leg whereas under the New York law he would receive nothing for the first
40 weeks of total disability. Thus, he might receive an additional Si,ooo, VT. STAT. §§8o96, 8102
0947), as amended by Pub. Laws 1949, No. 194.
09 Material on the point is noted in McNiece and Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and
Compensation, 27 N. Y. U. L. REv. 585, notes 56, 57, and 93 (1952).
It is said that in New York City the cost of insurance is now equal to or greater than the cost of
motor fuel. There have been seven increases in the rates since World War II.
In Massachusetts losses have risen from $700,000 in 1946 to $5,ooo,ooo in 1951. The Massachusetts
companies claim that they are losing money on this business and they asked for an increase of 22 per
cent and were allowed 9.7 per cent.
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niggardly basis. Where weekly benefits are tied to weekly earnings the statute
adjusts to inflationary movements but a great many of the statutes contain upper
limits fixed in dollars which in time become obsolete and are changed only after
considerable agitation. Another defect in many of the statutes is an absolute limit
on the number of weekly payments in cases of total disability. Tle railroad unions
have opposed the enactment of a compensation scheme in place of the FELA. It
is argued that the present schemes of compensation are inadequate and unfair. It
is argued that it is unfair to return the railroad workers to the statutes of their
respective states with their wide varieties of inadequacy. Abstractly it would not
seem unfair that railroad workers be subject to the same law as other workers in
their respective states. But undoubtedly many of these statutes are unfair in themselves. Under the circumstances a federal statute generously devised would provide
leadership.
In England all persons are now insured against injury and disease. The statute
retains, in addition, actions based on negligence even against the injured person's
employer, though 50 per cent of the insured benefit can be offset. It has been suggested both in connection with FELA and in automobile accident compensation
schemes that as in the English system the negligence concept might be retained
as an addition to a compensation scheme. Some have said that then negligence
could be administered in a meaningful sense, requiring "real" fault or covering nontypical risks. But in appraising the impact and significance of the double basis in
England it must be realized that the insured benefits are at a uniform minimum
level taking no account of differences in earning capacity. Benefits for workconnected injuries are higher but even these benefits are modest by our standards;
and the insured person must make a weekly contribution. 0 The negligence principle should be retained, of course, to cover non-insurable risks. But it is a more
arguable question whether negligence should be retained as a basis for additional
compensation. We have shown that negligence as administered today does not
signify seriously unsocial conduct. Our experience with degrees of negligence is
not such as to lead us to believe that juries can make meaningful distinctions between minimal fault and "real" fault. Furthermore, such recoveries will, of course,
be paid by insurance unless insurance for them is outlawed. The question still ariies
"0This scheme is financed by contributions from the insured person, the employer, and the state.
National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, g and io GEo. 6, c. 62; Family Allowances and
National Insurance Act, 1952, x ELIZ. 2, C. 29. The weekly injury benefit thereunder (temporary total
disability) is 55 shillings (C2 15s). For an injury resulting in disablement the benefit ranges from iis
for 2o per cent to 55s for ico per cent with an addition of 2os if beneficiary is incapable of work
and likely to remain permanently so incapable. To these add xos. 6d. for a child or the oldest child
and 2ss. 6d. for a dependent spouse. Thus, if a worker is totally disabled, cannot work at all, and
has a wife and child, he would receive, as I figure it, 1o7s (, 5 7s.).
The benefits for non-work connected injuries will be found in National Insurance Act, 1946, 9 and
so GEo. 6, c. 87. The basic benefit is 26s.
The negligence action is governed by Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act, 5948, is and x2 GEo. 6,
C. 41.

See generally Friedmann, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HAxv. L.
241, at 253 et Xeq. (1949).
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whether our insurance fund should bear these additional charges. Most of the defendants, too, will be corporate and there is little logic in charging them further
for the negligence of their employees; it might still be argued that additional recovery should be permitted in cases of willful misconduct, or in cases where top
management has failed to follow good engineering practice. 1 The principal
function of penalizing fault is, of course, preventive. And there is evidence that
policing of the risk by insurers-which takes place without having additional liability for negligence-is a more effective preventive than the threat of liability
(which is usually insured anyhow).72
A recent writer, Frank Grad, has pointed to the Saskatchewan auto accident
compensation scheme as proof of the feasibility of providing a minimal compensation for all injuries while retaining the negligence suit.7 3 Under the scheme everyone injured by auto is insured by the state. The premiums are very low 7 4 The
benefits are modest compared even to our workmen's compensation schemesY The
government also writes insurance against liability for negligence. In its first two
years there were 6,306 claims, benefits amounted to $I,277,5oo.70 Claims were
quickly settled. There have been relatively few claims for additional compensation based on negligence. This plan then has worked very well in Saskatchewan.
Basically it has probably resulted in a classification of injuries depending on their
seriousness. Where the injury is small, the statutory compensation is accepted;
where it is large a further claim is made and if one is fortunate enough to have
been injured by a careless driver he recovers additional compensation. Such a
classification whether logical or not may well promote "customer satisfaction."
Mr. Grad believes that the Saskatchewan experience has proved the general
worth of the scheme. But at least certain questions arise as to its transferability to
a jurisdiction such as New York. We would have to know the comparative accident rates. Saskatchewan is a rural, New York a dense metropolitan area. It will
be noted, too, that the average recovery in Saskatchewan was $200 per claim. Writers
on this subject tend to overlook the fact that Americans think in comparatively
extravagant terms. Our recoveries are amazingly large compared to those in other
countries, justified up to a point, of course, by our greater wealth. Our recent
writers and courts encourage, as we have seen, the disposition of juries to think in
See
"I1n Germany the employer is held only for willful misconduct, in Austria for gross negligence.
•
Lenhoff, Sodal Insurance Replacing Workmen's Compensation, 5 NACCA L. J. 49, 54 (o950)

Suggestions for limiting liability in the English scheme to gross negligence were rejected. Friedmann,
stupra note 70, at 257. Degrees of negligence are apparently not popular with English lawyers.
The English judges have said that "gross negligence is ordinary negligence with a vituperative epithet . . ." See Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., L. R. s C. P. 6oo (1866) printed in SEAVEV
AND KEETON'S CASES ON TORTS.

7 See James, supra note r, at 557.
a Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 5o COL. L. REV. 300 (1950).

" The fund is provided by premiums on autos of $4.50 to $So.oo per year.
"Death benefits at $3oo0 for a primary dependent, and for all dependents a maximum of $So,ooo.
Permanent total disability-a maximum of $20 per week until $2400 has been received.
Temporary total disability-a maximum of $20 per week up to 52 weeks.
7 See Grad, supra note 73, at 323.
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generous terms. Our people grow increasingly "claim-conscious." This means not
only that they press a claim when they have one. It means also that they have
ample ideas of the magnitude of their injury and, further, that they are more
imaginative in the attribution of their ailments to the conduct of insured persons.
The concept of "insurability" expands the horizons of plaintiffs and juries. The
ethical sense-or the sense of caution-becomes somewhat dulled in the presence of
an impersonal insurance fund. This is, perhaps, one of the general problems of a
"security state."
Writers recognize these facts but usually do no more than make a few pious
caveats before ignoring them in their conclusion. The courts, it is said, have the
power and perspicacity to expose fraud; they will demand adequate cogent evidence; they will curb the excesses of juries. But once rules of law concerning the
elements of liability are established these asserted defenses against "abuse" are
speedily forgotten. The current cliches about the sphere of the jury are ill-adapted
to the task of curbing it; they express, furthermore, the general uncertainty as to
what principles should prevail in this area. Even some of the judges, when they sit
as triers of fact, think and feel as would the jury or seek to adopt its attitudes.
In a recent article McNiece and Thornton sum up many of the factors in the
current situation: the high "claims consciousness" of New Yorkers,7 7 the tremendous
increase in insurance rates. They are aware also of the great abuses of compensating
psychic injury-the opportunity for simulation and (more common) attribution of

preexisting neuroses to the defendant's conduct.7" "Yet withal they impliedly advocate the abolition of the negligence requirement without dealing in any positive
fashion with the mounting cost of insurance. They reject, for example, any
notion of a schedule of fixed recoveries :7
17See notes 2 and 69, supra. Dickerson in his Products Liability and the Food Consumer (195i) at
offers evidence that out of 38,000 claims against insurers for food liability 67 per cent were from
the New York Metropolitan area, 12Z from Boston, and the remainder spread around the country!
249

In a recent year the "X" grocery chain paid $14,OOO claims in New York, $8i,ooo in Boston, $1,500
in Chicago, and none in Los Angeles. The same chain with 50 stores in Philadelphia had paid one
claim in 9 years.
" Professor McNiece has treated very well the problems involved in compensation of psychic injury
in his article, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. Jousts L. REv. 1 (0949). He dis-

tinguishes between normal and idiosyncratic responses to stimuli and would allow very little recovery
for the latter. id. at 76. He notes, however, that verdicts allow somewhere around $9,ooo for psychic
diseases of either sort, laymen having been much oversold on the liability of the ordinary man to traumatic psychosis. Id. at 77, note 254.
I would agree with Professor McNiece though his position in some measure rejects the usual view
that you "take the plaintiff as he is." See for example, Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., New York
Court of Appeals, Oct. 24, 1952.

Professor McNiece says further, "Dangers of fabrication of evidence where they exist can be effectively
combated by demanding clear and cogent evidence according to the best medical standards available."
Id. at 81. Apropos of this suggestion, the Supreme Court in New York City has recently approved
the establishment of a panel of physicians to examine plaintiffs in cases where the evidence is conflicting.
The expert will be subject to call at the trial. This, said Judge Peck, should have a "psychological
and prophylactic effect." N. Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1952, P. a. It remains to be seen how such evidence
will affect the attitude of the jury. Perhaps, however, as insurance rates mount juries will be more
discriminating.
7026 ST. JOHNs L. REv. at 274.
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... the courts, trained as they are in dealing with the facts and equities of particular
cases and having broad latitude in awarding damages, can more justly determine accident
cases....

It would seem to me that at least in industrial accidents we should retain our
present scheme of compensation without the addition of a negligence suit against
the employer. It is better to put the money into more generous compensation payments than into a capricious dividend based on the manner in which one's fellow
servant happened to contribute to the injury. The automobile accident situation is
more difficult and this not the place to explore it. We could perhaps profit from
experimentation. We might try a very modest payment to everyone injured and
retain the negligence suit but with certain of its excrescences lopped off. It is more
difficult to police the automobile risk than the industrial accident risk. If to a certain
extent the driver's concern for his own safety may induce care, this concern may
operate with least effect on the "accident-prone" driver who is the greatest menace.
And so perhaps we should, as a further incentive, retain the risk of increased recovery for negligence. But if we permit the driver to insure the whole risk, we do
not achieve our objective. We might conclude that the negligent driver should in
every case be required to pay part of the loss if he wishes to retain his license. In
any case, we should reduce the problem to its essential terms which are (a) the
prevention of injury and (b) compensation for such harms and in such measure
as the common insurance fund can be fairly asked to provide.

